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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
GARY LAMONT SORENSEN, : Case No. 20020964-CA 
Defendant/Appellee, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State appeals from an order refusing to bind over and dismissing an information 
charging defendant with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, possession of 
drug paraphernalia, and possession or use of morphine and methamphetamine. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
Did the preliminary hearing magistrate err in refusing to bind over possession charges 
where the evidence established that: (1) pursuant to a search warrant, the police discovered 
in defendant's bedroom in his home: measuring scales, a metric weight set for checking the 
accuracy of the scales, Ziplock bags with traces of methamphetamine, spoons with 
methamphetamine residue, syringes with methamphetamine residue, and propane torches, 
(2) the scales and packaging materials found in defendant's bedroom were "consistent" with 
illegal drug sales, (3) defendant's Day Planner left in the same bedroom contained "pay 
sheets," used to record drug sales, (4) defendant spent the night prior to the search in the 
home and left only a few hours before the search warrant was executed, (5) defendant was 
on probation for possession and distribution of controlled substances, (6) twelve days after 
the search, defendant's urine tested positive for methamphetamine and morphine? 
Whether probable cause exists to support a bindover presents a question of law which 
is reviewed on appeal for correctness. State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, % 8, 44 P.3d 730 
(citing State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, fl 8 & 15-16,20 P.3d 300); State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 
44 (Utah App. 1995). The State preserved the issue at R. 17-21 and R. 39: 60-74. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-2(dd) (2002) is determinative: 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group 
possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or 
user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have 
individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if 
it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more persons in the 
use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the activity 
was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place or under 
circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it. 
This and any other provision cited in the body of this brief are reproduced in Addendum A. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 21, 2002, defendant was charged with: 
Count I - Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a second 
degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (2002), occurring on 
August 8, 2002; 
Count II - Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (2002), occurring on August 8, 
2002;1 
Count III'- Possession or Use of Morphine, a third degree felony, in violation 
of section 58-37-8, occurring on August 20, 2002; 
Count IV- Possession or Use of Methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in 
violation of section 58-37-8, occurring on August 20,2002; 
Count V - Interference with Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1999), occurring on August 20, 
2002. 
(R. 1-3, 12-13). Following preliminary hearing, the magistrate refused to bind defendant 
over and dismissed Counts I-IV (R. 15-16, 25-27). According to the magistrate, probable 
cause did not support the possession charges because the State failed to establish defendant's 
actual or constructive possession of the drugs and paraphernalia found in defendant's home 
(R. 25-27, 29-30; R.39: 73-74). The remaining charge of interference (Count V) was 
dismissed with prejudice upon motion of the State (R. 29-30). On November 6, 2002, the 
State timely appealed the refusal to bind over and dismissal of Counts I-IV (R. 31-33). 
1
 The information lists Count II as a violation of section 58-37a-8 (R. 2). This 
appears to be a typographical error as no such section exists; possession of drug 
paraphernalia is prohibited in section 58-37a-5. See Addendum A. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
In April 2001, defendant was placed on supervised probation following convictions 
for third-degree felony possession of a controlled substance and second-degree felony 
distribution of a controlled substance (R. 39: 30). As required, defendant listed his legal 
residence with Adult Probation and Parole; the residence was a three-bedroom trailer located 
at 660 South 600 East, Mount Pleasant, Utah (R. 39: 8,13,25). The trailer was within 1000 
feet of a high school (R. 39: 12). 
A Mount Pleasant City police officer lived across the street (R. 39:9). In June 2002, 
the officer reported that defendant's trailer was receiving a lot of short term traffic indicative 
of illegal drug sales (id.). Based on this information, members of the Central Utah Narcotics 
Task Force maintained periodic drive-by surveillance of defendant's trailer (R. 39: 8-9). 
On August 7,2002, defendant spent the night at his trailer (R. 39:32). The next day, 
August 8, defendant left the trailer around 6:30 p.m. (R. 39:16,22,31). Approximately three 
hours later, the police, accompanied by a probation officer, entered the trailer pursuant to a 
search warrant (id.).3 The only person inside was defendant's ex-wife, who confirmed that 
the trailer was defendant's residence and said that for the last 5-7 days, she was staying at the 
trailer with defendant's permission (R. 39: 13,21-22,32). The ex-wife explained that she 
2
 The preliminary hearing facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution. See Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,' \ 10; State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, H 3, 26 
P.3d 223 (both citing State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,438 (Utah 1998)). 
3
 A defendant may not challenge a search warrant at a preliminary hearing. See 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7((h)(2) (Addendum A). Consequently, no issue relating to the validity 
of the search is at issue in this appeal. 
4 
and her son used one bedroom, the son's friend used another, and defendant slept in the 
master bedroom (R. 39: 13, 26-27, 32). 
The police found drug residue and drug paraphernalia in each of the three bedrooms 
and in the trailer's common bathroom (R. 39: 13-14, 18-20, 27-28). 
In the master bedroom, defendant's bedroom, syringes and spoons with 
methamphetamine residue were discovered (R. 39: 12,19-20). One spoon was on the night 
stand next to his bed; the other was in a "cubby hold" of the bed's headboard or in a nearby 
dresser drawer (R. 39: 19, 31). "[Different sets of scales," "propane torches, lighters,... 
a metric set that checks the accuracy of your scales, [and] [Zjiplock bags'.' containing traces 
ofmethamphetamine were also discovered in the room (R. 39:12,13-14,20,28.30-31). The 
packaging and scales were "consistent" with drug distribution (R. 39: 14, 30-31). 
Additionally, defendant's Day Planner was on the bed or dresser (R. 39: 13,27). Inside the 
Planner was defendant's Social Security card and "pay sheets," typically used to record drug 
sales, with "a lot of names with amounts owing" written in columns (R. 39: 13,28-29, 31).4 
A warrant for defendant's arrest was obtained (R. 39: 10-11, 35-36). Twelve days 
later, on August 20, 2002, the police located defendant at the same trailer (id.). They told 
defendant they had an arrest warrant and asked him to come out of the trailer (R. 39: 37-40, 
44, 46-47). When he did not, the police entered and found defendant locked in the master 
bedroom (R. 39: 40-41-42, 48-49). They arrested and transported him to jail (R. 39: 43). 
4
 Other items found in the master bedroom confirmed that the room was occupied 
by defendant, including male clothing, business receipts in defendant's name, "a lot of 
paperwork" bearing defendant's name, and some prescription bottles with his name (R. 
39: 27, 33-34). 
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At the jail, defendant voluntarily provided a urine specimen (id.). The specimen 
tested positive for methamphetamine and morphine (id.). Defendant told the police that he 
had a prescription for Lortab (morphine) at home (R. 39: 45, 51-52).5 
Defendant was charged with possession of the methamphetamine and paraphernalia 
discovered in his bedroom on August 8 (Counts I & II) and the possession or use of 
methamphetamine and morphine based on the urine analysis on August 20 (Counts III & IV) 
(R. 1-3, 12-13).6 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate opined that probable 
cause did not support a bindover on the possession charges (R. 26). According to the 
magistrate, "possession" requires actual and exclusive control, but here defendant lived with 
others and was not present during the August 8th search (R. 39: 60-61, 68-69). The 
magistrate asked what "constructive possession" meant and asked the prosecutor if 
"something . . . says that possessing, even though you're miles away, is sufficient" (R. 39: 
68-69). The magistrate was skeptical because "all the cases I know of seem to me to say 
5
 The probation officer who participated in the August 8th search testified that he 
found prescription bottles for some narcotic, possibly Lortab (also referred to as Loritab), 
in defendant's bedroom (R. 39: 33-34). No evidence was presented concerning the 
validity or date of the prescriptions, the precise drugs prescribed, or if the bottles 
discovered in the bedroom even contained any pills. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-
7(5)(b) & 58-37-15(1) & (2) (2002) (placing the burden on the defendant to establish that 
his possession or use of a controlled substance is pursuant to a valid prescription) 
(Addendum A). 
6
 Defendant was also charged with interference with arresting officer, a class B 
misdemeanor (Count V). After the magistrate refused to bind over Counts I-IV, the State 
moved to dismiss Count V with prejudice; the motion was granted (R. 24, 29-30). 
Therefore, the interference charge is not at issue on appeal. 
6 
you've got [to have] the ability to reach out and touch something if you're gonna [sic] be 
guilty of possession" (R. 39: 68-69, 74). With the magistrate's permission, the prosecutor 
submitted a memorandum on constructive possession (R. 17-21), but the magistrate 
nevertheless continued to refuse to bind over because, according to the magistrate, 
[t]here was no evidence to show that the defendant was engaged in the 
criminal enterprise of possession or use of a controlled substance. The 
defendant made no incriminating statements. He was not close to the drugs 
because he was not present. There was no evidence showing that he was 
participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drug 
paraphernalia. 
(R. 26) (Addendum B). The magistrate dismissed the felony drug possession and 
misdemeanor paraphernalia charges based on the August 8th search (Counts I & II), and 
without further explanation, dismissed the felony drug possession/use charges based on the 
August 20th urine analysis (R. 25-27 & 29-30) (Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to applicable standards, the magistrate failed to view the preliminary hearing 
evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the information. 
Similarly, the magistrate failed to distinguish between the low level of evidentiary proof 
necessary for bindover (probable cause/believable evidence) and the high level of proof 
necessary for conviction (proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Additionally, the magistrate erred in interpreting the elements of possession of a 
controlled substance and/or drug paraphernalia. Contrary to the magistrate's ruling, proof 
of actual physical possession of the prohibited substance or object is not required, nor is 
proof of a defendant's exclusive control. Instead, a defendant may legally "possess" an 
7 
object when there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the object to support a 
factual inference that the he had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over 
it. 
Here, the evidence readily supports that nexus. Because probable cause supports the 
charges, the magistrate had no legal basis to refuse to bind over or to dismiss the information. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES; THEREFORE, 
THE MAGISTRATE HAD NO LEGAL BASIS TO REFUSE TO BIND 
OVER OR TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION 
In refusing to bind over and dismissing the information, the magistrate (1) failed to 
apply the proper evidentiary and legal standards governing preliminary hearings, (2) failed 
to interpret the legal requirements for "possession," and (3) failed to factually distinguish 
between the August 8th and 20th offenses. When the preliminary hearing evidence is correctly 
assessed, it is clear that probable cause supports the information and, therefore, bindover is 
mandated and dismissal of the information inappropriate. Consequently, the Counts I-IV 
should be reinstated and defendant ordered to trial. 
(A) The Magistrate Failed to Apply the Proper Evidentiary and Legal 
Standards in Assessing the Sufficiency of the Preliminary Hearing Evidence. 
The standards governing preliminary hearings are well-established. In felony cases, 
the prosecution must present sufficient evidence at a preliminary hearing to establish 
"probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and the defendant has 
committed it." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(h)(1) {Addendum A). Here, this means probable cause 
8 
to believe that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed, in a drug free zone, the 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia found in his bedroom on August 8 (Counts I & II), 
and that he knowingly and intentionally used the methamphetamine and morphine found in 
his urine on August 20 (Counts III & IV). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-l(2)(a) (1999) 
(recognizing that when misdemeanors are charged in a felony information, "the defendant 
is afforded a preliminary hearing" on all offenses) {Addendum A). See also UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8 (2002) (delineating elements of felony possession); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37a-5 (2002) (delineating elements of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia); and 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-2(dd) (2002) (defining "possession"to include constructive 
possession and "use" to include injection and consumption) {Addendum A). 
Probable cause is "more than bare suspicion." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 175 (1949). On the other hand, probable cause to support a bindover "'need not be 
capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Schroyer, 
2002 UT 26, % 11, 44 P.3d 730 (quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 15, 20 P.3d 300). 
Instead, the quantum of evidence necessary for bindover is equivalent to that required for 
arrest: "believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id. Accord Brinegar, 
338 U.S. at 1310 ("[t]he substance of all definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground 
for belief of guilt"). 
In assessing the sufficiency of preliminary hearing evidence, a magistrate must view 
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences based on that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the information. See Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10 (citing State v. Talbot, 972 
9 
P.2d 435,437-38 (Utah 1998)); Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10. Even if an innocent explanation for 
the defendant's conduct might exist, "it not necessary that all legitimate reasons be absent 
before [the magistrate] finds probable cause." State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531,535 (Utah 1994) 
(explaining probable cause in context of police officer's decision to search). At the 
preliminary hearing stage, "all that the State must do is establish that its theory [of 
culpability] is reasonable." Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 12 (citing Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20). 
Consequently, "'[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should 
bind the defendant over for trial.'" Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10 (quoting Talbot, 972 P.3d 
at 437)). Here, the magistrate failed to properly apply these standards. 
The magistrate failed to view the preliminary evidence, and draw reasonable factual 
inferences based on that evidence, in favor of the information. Instead, the magistrate 
concluded that there was no evidence to show that "defendant was engaged in the criminal 
enterprise of possession or use of a controlled substance," and "no evidence showing that he 
was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drug paraphernalia" (R. 
26) {Addendum B). The magistrate's assessment is contrary to the record evidence. 
The undisputed testimony established: 
(1) defendant was a divorced father who resided in a three-bedroom trailer, 
within 1000 feet of a high school (R. 39: 8, 12-13, 21-22,25, 32); 
(2) defendant occupied the master bedroom (R. 39: 13, 26-27, 32); 
(3) defendant's son and the son's friend occupied the two other bedrooms; 
neither were present when the trailer was searched (R. 13, 26-27, 32); 
10 
(4) with defendant's permission, his ex-wife was temporarily living with their 
son in the son's bedroom for the last five to seven days and was present when 
the police conducted their search (R. 39: 13); 
(5) on August 7, defendant spent the night at the trailer and left around 6:30 
p.m. on August 8; he was not present when the search began three hours later 
(R.39: 13,16,22,31); 
(6) when defendant left on August 8, he did not lock his bedroom door and left 
numerous personal items in the bedroom, including clothing, business receipts, 
his Day Planner, and his Social Security card (R. 39: 13, 27, 33-34); 
(7) the police discovered items containing drug residue and drug paraphernalia 
in the son's and his son's friend's bedrooms and in the trailer's common 
bathroom (R. 39: 13-14, 18-20, 27-28);7 
(8) the police discovered spoons containing methamphetamine residue in 
defendant's bedroom on his night stand and in the cubby hold of the 
headboard or in a nearby dresser drawer (R. 39: 12,19-20, 31); 
(9) the police discovered syringes containing methamphetamine residue in 
defendant's bedroom (R. 39: 13-14, 20); 
(10) the police discovered Ziplock bags containing traces of methamphetamine 
in defendant's bedroom (id.); 
(11) the police discovered sets of scales, a gauge to test the scales, propane 
torches, and lighters in defendant's bedroom (R. 39: 13-14); 
(12) on August 20, twelve days after the search, the police arrested defendant 
at the same trailer after he locked himself in the master bedroom to avoid arrest 
(R. 39: 35-36,40-42); 
(13) the same day, defendant voluntarily provided a urine specimen which 
tested positive for methamphetamine and morphine (R. 39: 43); 
(14) when informed of the positive urine test, defendant claimed that he had 
a prescription for Lortab (morphine) at home (R. 39: 45); 
7
 Exactly what was found in the other bedrooms or bathroom was not disclosed at 
the preliminary hearing since defendant was not charged with possession of those items. 
11 
(15) a probation officer who participated in the August 8th search saw 
prescription bottles with defendant's name in defendant's bedroom; one of the 
prescriptions was possibly for Lortab or some other narcotic (R. 39: 33-34); 
Contrary to the magistrate's conclusion (R. 26) (Addendum 2?), this evidence, together with 
its reasonable inferences, was more than ample to establish probable cause that defendant 
illegally possessed methamphetamine in a drug free zone and illegally possessed drug 
paraphernalia on August 8 (Counts I & II), and that he illegally possessed or used 
methamphetamine and morphine on or about August 20 (Counts III & IV), 
But in addition, the preliminary hearing evidence established: 
(16) in August 2002, defendant was on probation for illegal drug usage and 
sales (R. 39: 30); 
(17) in August 2002, the trailer was listed as defendant's legal residence with 
Adult Probation and Parole (R. 39: 25); 
(18) the drugs and paraphernalia found in defendant's bedroom were not only 
consistent with personal drug usage, but also with illegal drug sales (R. 39:13-
14,27-28); 
(19) defendant's Day Planner, discovered on his bed or dresser, contained his 
Social Security card together with "pay" sheets, listing names and dollar 
amounts in columns, consistent with "billing" systems used in illegal drug 
sales (R. 39: 28-29); 
(20) a police officer who lived across the street from defendant observed short-
term traffic at the trailer indicative of illegal drug sales (R. 39: 9). 
Contrary to the magistrate's refusal to bind over, this evidence further supports probable 
cause to believe that defendant committed the possession crimes charged. 
The magistrate's erroneous conclusion that the evidence was insufficient arose from 
his over-reliance on case law in which possession convictions were reversed for insufficient 
12 
evidence (R. 42-54). But a finding of probable cause to support bind over "'need not be 
capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5" Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, 
\ 11 (quoting Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 15). For unlike conviction, bindover is warranted even 
when the facts presented at a preliminary hearing "give rise to two alternative inferences" 
and only one supports probable cause. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20. Accord State v. Lee, 863 
P.2d 49, 58 n.13 (Utah App. 1993) (distinguishing high level of proof necessary for 
possession conviction from minimal evidence necessary to es\a\Ais\iprobable cause to arrest 
for possession). As long as the State's theory of culpability is reasonable, the preliminary 
hearing magistrate is obligated to accept it. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ^ 10 & 12 (citing 
Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38, and Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20). Here, the State's theory of 
possession for Counts I-IV was eminently reasonable and, consequently, the magistrate was 
legally mandated to bind over. See id. 
(B) The Magistrate Failed to Properly Interpret the Legal Requirements of 
Possession. 
At the root of the magistrate's failure to bind over was his misinterpretation of the 
legal requirements for possession. According to the magistrate, "you've got [to have] the 
ability to reach out and touch something if you're gonna [sic] be guilty of possession" and, 
therefore, the magistrate could see no legal basis to infer possession if "you're miles away" 
(R. 39: 74). This is not a correct statement of the law. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-2(dd) defines possession to include "joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy," including joint or individual "injection and consumption" 
if the joint usage or control was knowing or the controlled substance "found in a place or 
13 
under circumstances indicating that the [defendant] had the ability and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over it." See Addendum A. Thus, under Utah law, 
[ajctual physical possession is not a required element of the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance. A finding of constructive possession by 
the defendant will satisfy the possession element. To prove that a defendant 
was in knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance, the 
prosecution need only establish that the produced contraband was found in a 
place or under circumstances indicating that the accused had the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. The mere occupancy of a 
portion of the premises where the drug is found cannot, without more, support 
a finding its knowing and intentional possession by the accused. There must 
be some additional nexus between the accused and the contraband to show that 
the accused had the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over 
it. 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987) (footnotes omitted, but citing State v. 
Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) and State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981)). The 
requisite nexus requires more than merely establishing that a defendant knew "of the 
whereabouts of illicit drugs and.. might even have access to them;" it requires evidence to 
support the inference that the defendant had the "intent to make use of that knowledge and 
ability." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
"A determination of constructive possession depends on the unique facts and 
circumstances of each case." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132. Factors generally include, but are 
not limited to: 
(1) who has ownership and/or occupies the premises where the drugs were found; 
(2) if ownership or occupancy is not exclusive, who has control over the 
specific area where the drugs were found; 
(3) if ownership or occupancy is not exclusive, the relationship between any 
occupants of the premises; 
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(4) whether the drugs were in plain or open view; 
(5) the defendant's access to the place where the drugs are found; 
(6) the proximity of the defendant to the drugs when discovered; 
(7) the proximity of personal items of the defendant to the drugs; 
(8) the nature and location of drug paraphernalia capable of facilitating the use 
or distribution of the drugs; 
(9) the presence of "grow books" or other items evidencing an intent to use or 
distribute the drugs; 
(10) evidence that defendant used part of the drugs found, either alone or with 
others; 
(11) evidence that defendant has previously or is presently using or selling 
drugs; 
(12) competent evidence of an informant's tip concerning defendant's nexus 
to the drugs; 
(13) incriminating statements by the defendant or any other occupant of the 
premises; 
See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20; State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1263-1264 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah App. 1991); and State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 
570-74 (Utah App. 1991). Accord State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, fl[ 14-15, 985 P.2d 911 
(cautioning that the list of factors are not "legal elements" and should not be viewed as 
"universally pertinent" or "exhaustive," but are simply relevant considerations). 
Here, the evidence established that defendant was a convicted drug user and 
distributer and presently on supervised probation. Drug sales appeared to be continuing at 
his residence, which he shared with his son and a son's friend. Five to seven days 
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previously, he permitted his ex-wife to temporarily move in with their son. Defendant was 
the only occupant of the master bedroom and, on August 7, had spent the night there and had 
left on August 8 just three hours prior to the search. Spoons and syringes with 
methamphetamine residue were found in the defendant's bedroom next to defendant's bed 
and/or in the bed's headboard. Ziplock bags with traces of methamphetamine were 
discovered in the same room, together with numerous other items indicative of drug usage 
and sales, including scales, a calibration gauge for the scales, propane torches, lighters, and 
"pay sheets." The "pay sheets" were in defendant's Day Planner which also contained his 
Social Security card. See Facts, supra at 4-6 & 10-12. 
On August 20, twelve days after the search, defendant locked himself in the same 
bedroom to avoid arrest. Urine analysis revealed that he had recently injected or otherwise 
consumed methamphetamine and morphine. See id. 
In sum, even though defendant was not present when drugs and paraphernalia were 
discovered in his home, the preliminary hearing evidence provides an abundant basis from 
which to infer that defendant not only knew that drugs and drug paraphernalia were in his 
bedroom, but that he had the "intent to make use of that knowledge and ability" to possess 
those items. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Moreover, based on the used spoons and syringes 
found in his bedroom on August 8, it is "believable" that he intentionally injected or 
consumed the drugs found in his urine on August 20. Because there was a factual basis to 
support each charge, the magistrate erred in refusing to bind over Counts I-IV. 
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(C) The Magistrate Failed to Distinguish Between the A ugust ffh and A ugust 
2ffh Charges. 
Despite the fact that the magistrate clearly dismissed Counts I-IV of the information, 
the basis for the ruling - that there was insufficient evidence defendant possessed the drugs 
and paraphernalia found in his room when he was "miles away" - only factually relates to 
the August 8th charges (Count I & II). See Magistrate's Oral Ruling (R. 60-74); Order of 
Dismissal (R. 25-27, 29-30) (Addendum B). The ruling provides no factual or legal 
explanation for the refusal to bind over Counts III-IV, both of which were based on 
defendant's positive urine analysis on August 20. See id. 
Because the preliminary hearing evidence established a reasonable basis from which 
to infer that defendant had knowingly used methamphetamine and morphine on or about 
August 20, Count III & IV should have been bound over. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
2(dd) (defining "possession or use" to include consumption and injection of a controlled 
substance). See also Subsection (B), supra. Consequently, the magistrate's blanket dismissal 
was erroneous. See Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10 (quoting Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38, a 
defendant should be bound over "'unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the prosecution's claim'"). 
17 
CONCLUSION 
The order dismissing the information should be reversed and the case remanded for 
entry of an order binding defendant over for trial on Counts I-IV. 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, 
,e defendant shall appear before the court as directed in the 
immons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest 
ith or without a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken 
i the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. If an 
iformation has not been filed, one shall be filed without delay 
sfore the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where 
le offense was committed the person arrested shall without 
nnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime 
ras committed and shall be taken before the proper magis* 
rate under these rules. 
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly 
eturned to the county and the charge against the defendant is 
misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be 
ntered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the 
>erson arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail, 
/aive trial in the district in which the information is pending* 
nd consent to disposition of the case in the county in which 
he person was arrested, is held, or is present. 
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of 
he court in which the information is pending shall transmit 
he papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the clerk of 
,he court for the county in which the defendant is arrested, 
leld, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county 
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that 
ssued the warrant. 
(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a 
misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be 
entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), &e 
defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a 
magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination ot 
bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without 
bail under Section 77-20-1. 
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdic-
tion over the offense, with the record made of the proceeding8 
before the magistrate. 
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense 
jharged shall, upon the defendant's first appearance, inform 
jie defendant: 
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and 
Ornish a copy; 
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of 
be information and how to obtain them; 
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed 
}y the court without expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any state-
ment, and that the statements the defendant does make may 
?e used against the defendant in a court of law. 
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information 
mder paragraph (d) and before proceeding further, allow the 
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel 
uid shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney by any 
-easonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, 
he magistrate shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by 
he magistrate as provided by law. 
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date 
nay not be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall 
>e held under these rules and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(g)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant 
jhall be advised of the right to a preliminary examination. If 
he defendant waives the right to a preliminary examination, 
md the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall 
>rder the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examina-
tion, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examina-
tion. The examination shall be held within a reasonable time, 
but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for 
the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant 
is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the 
magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination 
may not be held if the defendant is indicted. 
(h)(1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examina-
tion shall be held under the rules and laws applicable to 
criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of 
proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of 
the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also 
cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to 
believe that the crime charged has been committed and that 
the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order, in 
writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the 
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on 
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the 
ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not 
properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe 
that the crime charged has been committed or that the 
defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the 
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of 
dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense. 
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon 
request of either party, may exclude witnesses from the 
courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse with 
each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On 
the request of either party, the magistrate may order all 
spectators to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(j)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to 
the district court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a 
bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk of the district 
court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings 
before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any 
typewritten transcript. 
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody 
of the sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate 
commitment order. 
(k)(l) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that 
any material witness in a pending case will not appear and 
testify unless bond is required, the magistrate may fix a bond 
with or without sureties and in a sum considered adequate for 
the appearance of the witness. 
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the 
clerk of the court, the magistrate may commit the witness to 
jail until the witness complies or is otherwise legally dis-
charged. 
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the 
witness may be examined and cross-examined before the 
magistrate in the presence of the defendant and the testimony 
shall be recorded. The witness shall then be discharged. 
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any 
subsequent hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the 
recorded testimony may be used at the hearing or trial in lieu 
of the personal testimony of the witness. 
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(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belong-
ing, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallow-
ing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and includes indi-
vidual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled 
substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a 
controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown 
to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the 
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person 
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, 
possession, or control of any substances with knowledge 
that the activity was occurring, or the controlled sub-
stance is found in a place or under circumstances indicat-
ing that the person had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it. 
38-37-7. Labeling and packaging controlled substance. 
(DA person licensed pursuant to this act may not distrib-
ute a controlled substance unless it is packaged and labeled in 
compliance with the requirements of Section 305 of the 
Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act of 1970. 
(2) No person except a pharmacist for the purpose of filling 
a prescription shall alter, deface, or remove any label affixed 
by the manufacturer. 
(3) Whenever a pharmacist sells or dispenses any con-
trolled substance on a prescnption issued by a practitioner, he 
shall affix to the container in which the substance is sold or 
dispensed: 
(a) a label showing his own name, address, and registry 
number, or the name, address, and registry number of the 
pharmacist or pharmacy owner for whom he is lawfully 
acting; 
(b) the prescription number, the name of the patient, or 
if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner of the 
animal and the species of the animal; 
(c) the name of the practitioner by whom the prescrip-
tion was written; 
(d) any directions stated on the prescription; and 
(e) any directions required by rules and regulations 
promulgated by the department. 
(4) A person may not alter the face or remove any label so 
long as any of the original contents remain. 
(5j (a) An individual to whom or for whose use any con-
trolled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed 
by a practitioner and the owner of any animal for which 
any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or 
dispensed by a veterinarian may lawfully possess it only 
in the container in which it was delivered to him by the 
person selling or dispensing it. 
(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this subsec-
tion that the person being prosecuted produces in court a 
valid prescription for the controlled substance or the 
original container with the label attached. 1997 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervi-
sor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a 
controlled substance analog is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent con-
viction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule Vis guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if 
the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or 
in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeter-
minate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(lXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authonzed by 
this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mari-
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as denned in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that person 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2XaXii) or (2XaXiii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
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ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4XaXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4XaXi) through 
(viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger 
than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is 
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for 
a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would 
otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted 
under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
^ It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4Xa^  
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred 
was as described in Subsection (4Ka). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra-
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evi-
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this 
section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. IMS 
58-37-15. Burden of proof in proceedings on violations 
— Enforcement officers exempt from liability. 
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption 
or exception set forth in this act in any complaint, information, 
indictment or other pleading or trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding under this act, and the burden of proof of any 
exemption or exception is upon the person claiming its benefit. 
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly authorized 
holder of an appropriate license, registration, order form, or 
prescription issued under this act, he shall be presumed not to 
be the holder of a license, registration, order form, or prescrip-
tion, and the burden of proof is upon him to rebut the 
presumption. 
(3) No liability shall be imposed upon any duly authorized 
state or federal officer engaged in the enforcement of this act 
who is engaged in the enforcement of any law, municipal 
ordinance, or regulation relating to controlled substances. 
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58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with 
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, culti-
vate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, pro-
duce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this 
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with 
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any 
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will 
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manu-
facture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, 
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body in violation of this act. Any person who violates 
this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug 
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three 
years or more younger than the person making the delivery is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any 
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any ad-
vertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is 
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
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77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be 
charged in the same indictment or information if each offense 
is a separate count and if the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise con-
nected together in their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or 
plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged to-
gether the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing 
with respect to both the misdemeanor and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if they are alleged to have 
participated in the same act or conduct or in the same 
criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more 
counts together or separately and all of the defendants 
need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged 
with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the 
court in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders 
separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or 
informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, 
and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have 
been joined in a single indictment or information. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecu-
tion were under a single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is 
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an 
indictment or information or by a joinder for trial to-
gether, the court shall order an election of separate trials 
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide other relief as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or 
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least 
five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant 
for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to 
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he 
intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. 1990 
Addendum B 
DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE CO^NTY^TAM 
160 North Main (J£2J*J*XF\ 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135 
1 






ORDER ON PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION 
Assigned Judge David L. Mower 
A Preliminary Examination was conducted in this case on September 25, 2002. During 
the examination the following facts were shown. 
Findings of Fact 
1. The defendant was and is currently on probation and is being supervised by the 
Utah Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole. 
2. There is a single family residence located in the Sanpete County, Utah. 
3. A Search Warrant was issued. 
4. On August 8,2002 several officers went to the residence to execute the search 
warrant. 
5. The warrant was executed and the residence was searched. 
01\VoCOU&* 
ORDER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, Case number raKflgggfti, Page -2-
6. The defendant was not there. 
7. The following items were found in a bedroom 
a. A social security card in the name of the defendant. 
b. A calendar or day-planner bearing the name of the defendant. 
c. Men's clothing and other items generally found in a man's bedroom. 
8. Items of drug paraphernalia were found in the same bedroom. 
9. One of the searching officers had a conversation with a female person who was 
present and identified as the defendant's ex-wife. She said that the defendant was 
living in the residence and had spent the previous night there. 
10. The items of paraphernalia were tested and found to contain residue of 
methamphetamine, a controlled substance. 
Analysis 
The charge pending against the defendant is: ILLEGAL POSSESSION/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3RD Degree felony. 
There was no evidence to show that the defendant was engaged in the criminal enterprise 
of possession or use of a controlled substance. The defendant made no incriminating statements. 
He was not close to the drugs because he was not present. There was no evidence showing that he 
was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drug paraphernalia. 
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Conclusion 
The evidence was not sufficient to justify a bind over. Consequently, the charge against 
the defendant is dismissed. 
Date n r _, 2002 
DavicfL. Mower 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On October 3 D , 2002 a copy of this ORDER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
was sent by M=first- class mail, P=Clerk's office pickup box, F=Fax to: 
Addressee 
Randy M. Kennard 
Deputy Sanpete County Attorney 
160 North Main, Suite 306 
Manti, UT 84642 
Method Addressee Method 
M Shelden R. Carter M 
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357 
Sanpete County Attorney 
RANDY M. KENNARD #7907 
Deputy Sanpete County Attorney 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main - Suite 306 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435) 835-6381 
Facsimile: (435)835-6383 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
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> DISMISSAL ORDER 
> Criminal No. 021600151 
This matter having come before the Court for a review hearing on the 6th day of November 
2002; the Court having previously entered it's Order on Preliminary Examination" dated October 29, 
2002, which dismissed Count's I through IV of the Information; Randy M. Kennard appearing as 
counsel for the Plaintiff; Plaintiff having made a motion in open Court to dismiss with prejudice the 
remaining Count V of the Information, Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B 
Misdemeanor; the Court having found that a dismissal of the remaining charge is reasonable under the 
circumstances to facilitate Plaintiffs stated intention to pursue an appeal of right from the Court's 
previous Order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Information; 
NOW THEREFORE, Count V of the Information, Interference with an Arresting Officer, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
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State of Utah vs Sorensen 
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DATED this dax.oiN.ovember 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ 
DAVID L.MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
G CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Dismissal 
Order to the defendant's attorney, Sheldon Carter at 3325 No. University Ave, Suite 200, Provo, 
Utah 84604-4438 postage prepaid this _^fday of November 2002. 
By: 
